Background Paper on On-Site Inspections (OSI) Main Elements and Expectations

Dr. Mordechai Melamud

I. Introduction

A. Verification

Verification encompasses the gathering of information and the use of that information to make judgments about the compliance of parties with the terms of an agreement1. The concept of verification, therefore, includes the processes used to gather information and those persons or bodies charged with making compliance judgments. The process of gathering information about a particular activity, by local or remote means is called monitoring. The information is obtained by persons in the field or by technical means, or from the parties to the agreement.

It should be appreciated that the CTBT is different from other treaties foremost by having a unique, permanently installed, monitoring system with a worldwide coverage around the clock. This International Monitoring System (IMS) is a network of stations, which is attempting to be specifically targeted at detecting a particular type of activity, nuclear explosions. It is designed to detect, locate, and identify events that may be nuclear explosions. Due to cost consideration and technological shortcomings the IMS is deficient in some way in each of these goals: it is unable to detect events below a certain magnitude, it cannot locate the detected events to a defined small area with high accuracy, and last but not least it is unable to make reliable distinction between natural events, chemical explosions and nuclear explosions. Some of these shortcomings are technically inherent as a result of irregularity and complexity of the environment through which the signals travel from the source to the detecting station. This may be a result of climatic and weather changes affecting infrasound or radioactive debris distribution, or changing geophysical structures affecting seismological waves. As a result, the information gathered by the International Monitoring System may be inconclusive in many cases, and may not be clear enough for the decision making bodies of the organization to conclude that a State Party is guilty of non compliance.

B. CTBT verification regime

To compensate for the shortcomings of the IMS, and in order to help the Executive Council (EC) which is the decision making organ, the CTB Treaty has three more elements in its verification regime in addition to the IMS: Consultation and Clarification (C&C), On-Site Inspection (OSI), and Confidence Building Measures (CBM)2. In contrast to the IMS, which is a continuously-functioning system, these additional three elements are sporadic in nature and call, among other, for active initiatives and involvement from the States Parties.

CBMs are independent of the entry into force (EIF) of the Treaty. They can be performed voluntarily by States Parties, and actually some have already been performed. In addition to their political aspects CBMs have a technical value, as in the case of calibration experiments (such as the Dead Sea experiment4), which are aimed at the improvement of regional calibration in order to enhance the accuracy and reliability of the monitoring system. Information provided through such measures could be used for the consideration of an OSI and during its conduct, but the process itself is an independent one.

C&C is a process that could be initiated only after EIF of the Treaty. In case of concern about possible non-compliance with the basic obligations of the Treaty, States Parties are urged first to make every effort to clarify and resolve the concern through C&C, among themselves or with or through the Organization.3 Information provided through such a process could be used for the consideration of an OSI and during its conduct (actually, there is a Treaty provision obligating a State requesting an OSI to include the results of C&C in its request), but the process itself is alien to OSI.

OSI could be launched to clarify whether a suspicious event detected by monitoring means was a nuclear explosion. This element of the verification regime enables an on-the-spot survey for the actual event that raised a concern.

OSI is a unique feature of the CTBT, which is fundamentally different from other treaties' elements of verification. One main difference is that the decision of carrying out an OSI lies with the EC, and not with the executive organs of the organization (as it is in the NPT) or with any individual State Party (as is practically in the CWC). Another difference is the perception of OSI as rare, which is reflected by the fact that there is no permanent inspectorate in the organization, and the inspectors are generally not employees of the organization. Another characteristic which makes OSI different is the nature of the inspection, which mainly covers broad areas, and not facilities or plants.

By its character, OSI is the most intrusive element of the verification regime and should therefore be considered carefully, in order to avoid abuse or use for non-Treaty purposes, but still keeping it as a capable tool. OSI is envisioned as being used only after other measures of the Treaty, such as Consultation and Clarification, have been exhausted.

Like the other components of the verification regime, OSI has to be implemented and ready for operation at EIF2. For these reasons, even though OSIs are envisioned to be rarely used, a major effort has to be performed before EIF to set up the OSI regime, which can only be implemented after EIF. Therefore, in parallel to setting up the IMS, the PrepCom is also laying the groundwork for on-site inspections as is described below.

C. OSI in the CTBT verification regime

The Treaty, especially the Protocol, undertake the OSI as consequential as the IMS if we consider the detail and length of text devoted to it. This of course stems from the reasons mentioned above, and from the fact that OSI is an intrusive procedure and may touch on sensitive national issues, which are unrelated to the CTBT purpose. This is the reason that OSI issues, and most of all the Operational Manual for OSI (OpMan), are taken so seriously by WGB. The intrusiveness aspect of OSI is the reason for the OSI OpMan being developed by the states signatories and not by the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS). WGB is also developing the IMS/IDC OpMans, which unlike the OSI OpMan, are mostly technical in nature, and have no intrusiveness aspects. These manuals deal with the technical operation of stations, which is done by the host state parties, and with the IDC operations in Vienna.

D. OSI as a deterrent

OSI is different from the other elements of the CTBT verification regime in that it is present in the background as a possibility in case of a suspected violation, unlike the IMS/IDC, which are a continuous monitoring system, collecting and analyzing data all the time. A well-prepared OSI regime should therefore serve first of all as a deterrent, discouraging a potential violator because of the high probability it creates for exposure.

Being a rare event, an OSI that ends without contributing to clarification of an ambiguous event that raised the concern, or an abusive OSI, may seriously undermine the value of the CTBT verification regime. Like any other deterrent, it has to be capable of achieving its intended outcome in case of a suspected violation of the Treaty. Hence, it is important to develop the OSI regime to be the best possible in order that it will have a deterrence value. In order that it will be grasped as an effective tool that has to be taken seriously by any potential evader, it should not be allowed to become a sloppy and ill-defined regime, and therefore the needed guidance should be well established for efficient and successful performance.

II. OSI's main purpose and provisions

A. The purpose

The sole purpose of an OSI is to clarify whether or not a nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of the Treaty. The mission of the Inspection Team (IT), as derived from this purpose, is a monitoring task with the goal of providing plausible technical findings, enabling the EC to make the decision whether the event that caused the concern was a nuclear explosion or not. The OSI team will have to furnish direct technical results indicating that the event that caused the concern was a nuclear explosion, or that it was not a nuclear explosion (i.e. a natural event or a non-nuclear man-made event), or that there is no way to prove either one of the two.

Unlike a police operation or the UNSCOM mission, OSI is a process based on balances defined in the Treaty, including agreed measures that preserve the rights and obligations of both the IT and the Inspected State Party (ISP). The OSI should be, according to the Treaty, a sharp but constrained tool to be used with minimum intrusiveness, high efficiency, transparency, under specified timelines and using only the techniques and equipment provided by the Treaty.

The avoidance of intrusiveness is first of all directed to protect national security interests and to prevent disclosure of confidential information not related to the purpose of the inspection. This principle pertains to the gathering of data, where the Treaty maintains that only relevant data is to be gathered by the IT. A clear example of what is meant by relevant data is illustrated by the instructions in the Treaty for measuring only those parts of the gamma spectrum which are relevant to nuclear explosions6, which has been already elaborated by WGB and resulted in defining "information barrier", or "blinding" of radiation measuring devices to be used during OSI. This "blinded" device will reveal to the user only those parts of the data that may be relevant to a nuclear explosion, but not related to other activities such as nuclear reactor operation. The tight timelines and other constraints dictated by the Treaty should be regarded as a compromise that takes into account the needs to clarify the situation and to reduce intrusiveness caused by the disruption of normal life in the ISP.

B. OSI process - request to deployment

When a State Party to the CTBT is concerned that a nuclear explosion was carried out in non-compliance with the Treaty on the basis of an event detected by the IMS, or on the basis of its National Technical Means, that State may request an On Site Inspection. A concerned State Party is solicited to carry out Consultation and Clarification with the suspected State Party before requesting an OSI, a process during which these States may take any agreed steps they deem necessary in order to clarify the event that raised the concern of non-compliance. If the concerned State is not satisfied with the outcome of this C&C process, it may request the EC to launch an OSI to clarify whether the event of concern was a nuclear explosion.

For an OSI to proceed, after a request has been filed by a State Party, it has to be approved by the Executive Council by an affirmative vote of at least 30 of the 51 EC members. The OSI will be carried out on the basis of a mandate issued by the Director-General (DG) based on the EC decision. This is the only process leading to an OSI according to the Treaty. The state party sought to be inspected is obliged to permit the OSI, and not to impede the ability of the inspection team to perform its activities within the inspection area as decided by the DG and included in the inspection mandate.

An OSI may be conducted within limitations provided by the Treaty. An inspection team (IT) of no more then 40 members is permitted to inspect an area no larger than 1000 square kilometers (a continuous area with no linear distance greater than 50 kilometers in any direction). The Treaty permits the inspected state party (ISP) to restrict or manage access of the IT to sensitive locations within the inspection area (IA).

The timelines of OSI as dictated by the Treaty are different from those of the CWC challenge inspection for an obvious reason: unlike the CWC where the phenomena causing the concern of non-compliance may be removed (a process stopped or materials shipped away), the phenomena associated with a nuclear explosion, especially an underground explosion, are not likely to move away; the underground cavity stays in place, and the radioactivity is there for a long time. It may even be more evident after many days when the radioactive isotopes seep out to the surface. This radioactivity is the "smoking gun" of a nuclear explosion, and some of the radioactive debris will stay there for weeks, month, and even years. The IT is therefore required to start the inspection within some 9 days after the submission of the OSI request. The default duration of the inspection is up to day 60 after the EC approval, but it could be extended, if needed, up to day 130. It could also be shortened, if the IT so recommends.

C. Activities and technologies

After arriving in the IA the IT will have to explore it, looking for any possible signs of a recent event compatible with the event that triggered the request for the OSI. The 15 activities and techniques (and only these) allowed to be used by the IT in (and only in) the IA are enumerated in Part II, Paragraph 69 of the Protocol7.

The Treaty provides for different techniques to be used during successive periods of the inspection7 in accordance with IT activities. In the initial period (up to day 25 after the EC approval of the OSI), equipment is provided for general area search, aimed at narrowing the search area; this includes position finding, radioactivity measurements and passive seismic techniques. During this period the IT will try to locate sites or limited sections of the IA in which signs are found that may possibly point to the event that triggered the request. In the rest of the inspection periods (up to day 130), the IT inspection activities may be focused on these sub-areas. During this period various geophysical techniques7, such as active seismology, are provided to enable the detection of localized anomalies and artifacts that may be characteristic of the triggering event being a nuclear explosion. Most of these geophysical techniques are time consuming and are relevant for deployment in a small area of no more than a few square kilometers; therefore the narrowing process of the initial period is of utmost importance. The final step of an OSI may be the use of specialized drilling equipment, to obtain radioactive samples, which are the "smoking gun" of a nuclear explosion. Moving to the second period of the inspection, as well as drilling, require the approval of the EC.

Although most of the equipment for the techniques defined in paragraph 69 may be available off the shelf, these are not all directly applicable to OSI in light of the special needs for detection of nuclear explosion signatures and the non-intrusiveness dictated for the OSI regime. The development of the required modifications for existing equipment, although time consuming, can be overcome by existing engineering practices (e.g. "blinded" radiation measurements), but even then some inherent shortcomings of the techniques may not be overcome.

In view of the lengthy duration of the inspection (up to a maximum of 130 days) the IT will need significant in-country support from the ISP. Substantial amounts of portable equipment will be needed, including geophysical and radionuclide equipment, drilling equipment, communications equipment and the means to conduct over-flights.

III. Status and problems of preparations for the future OSI regime

A. The elements of the OSI regime

In order for the verification regime to be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty, it (and the resolution on the establishment of the PrepCom) prescribe to the PrepCom to prepare before EIF three main components of the OSI regime: The list of equipment based on the technologies dictated by the Treaty for use during OSI, including purchase and application of these equipment; The OpMan for OSI which includes guidelines for all the persons and organs who are involved on behalf of the CTBTO in the OSI process; The training and exercise program for inspectors.

The process of preparing the instruments of the OSI regime is taking place in Vienna these days by State Signatories. The preparations include workshops attended by experts in the different fields which are the basis of the OSI, technical discussions in the OSI task group of WGB, and deliberations about political aspects related to OSI. International experts are also assisting in identifying elements required for an OSI infrastructure, including an Operations Support Centre, data bank and an equipment storage and maintenance facility. Initial drafts of the required documents are shaping up, based on these discussions and written contributions by State Signatories and the PTS. This is a lengthy process that cannot be advanced too rapidly because of its multilateral aspects, but it is anticipated to culminate eventually in consensus based on agreed solutions and compromises by the participants.

Of the three elements of preparation for OSI - Operational Manual (OpMan), equipment, and training - the last two present fewer difficulties than the first one. Although slowing the process, these two have less political implications and can be overcome by existing engineering and planning practices.

B. Status of preparations 1. Equipment

An initial list of equipment for testing and training purposes has been drawn up and future OSI equipment has been divided into seven categories: Seismic Aftershock Monitoring System; Gamma Search and Identification Tools; High Resolution Gamma Spectrometer; Xenon Sampling, Separation and Measurement Tool; Visual Equipment; Communications Equipment; and Auxiliary Equipment.

The procurement of equipment for the first period of the inspection is more or less under way; Procurement has begun of the radionuclide search and identification equipment, of seismic equipment for passive and resonance seismology, for visual inspection activities, and auxiliary equipment. Equipment for the other techniques are still to be discussed in view of the tailoring of these techniques to the OSI needs and for the detection of nuclear explosion signatures. These are labor consuming, but generally not a politically disputed area.

2. Training In order to have a wide base of potential inspectors from which 40 could be summoned on short notice for an OSI, an intensive training program has to be planned and executed. This training has to prepare prospective inspectors, inspection assistants, and inspection team leaders who are experts in their fields, for the special application of techniques for the OSI requirements, for the special environment of operation under the Treaty provisions, and for the synergy to be practiced in the team work. A major consideration in preparing the training program is the fact that experience and expertise in nuclear explosion phenomena will be decreasing with time, and the training program must compensate for that.

Training planning is underway, and several introductory courses have already been carried out, creating an initial list of some 150 inspectors (and inspector assistants) candidates. The first experimental advanced course is under preparation and will be carried out soon.

A general outline of the long term training process to be deployed after EIF has been discussed and accepted by WGB. The planning of this process is now being done by the OSI division of the PTS, with the help of expert sub-contractors. The main element missing for the finalization of a more advanced training process is the OSI Operational Manual.

It has also to be remembered that as OSI will be a rare event, and as years without accumulated nuclear testing experience pass by, no experience will be gathered beyond training and exercises. The training program and the OpMan (see below) should take this into account by providing a well-prepared framework of training and guidelines for the prospective inspectors, who will acquire their expert education and experience in a world hopefully devoid of nuclear explosions.

3. Operational Manual The OSI Operational Manual (OpMan) is assembled from texts of sections and chapters contributed by States Signatories and the PTS. The different contributions are merged into one edited text by the Program Coordinator for OSI, with the help of a few expert Friends nominated by him. This process, including the layout of the OpMan, has been approved by the PrepCom. As a first step, a basic document - the Initial Draft Rolling Text (IDRT) of the OSI OpMan - is under development to allow serious and effective elaboration on the Manual, including the politically sensitive aspects. The majority of the IDRT parts will most probably be ready for the elaboration process at the end of March 2001, but the process of completing the work on this manual is expected to be long, probably a few years.

The main difficulties in the preparation for the OSI regime are encountered in the development of the OpMan. The Treaty only outlines the general rules for OSI, without going into details of many, and totally neglecting some, of the issues related to OSI leaving these to be prepared by the PrepCpm before EIF. The major predicaments this process is facing are the disparity in views of State Signatories on the scope and level of detail of the documents to be developed, and the definition of the equipment to be used under the technologies dictated in the Treaty. The emerging picture in the discussions of WGB is that the timelines defined by the Treaty for the OSI are very tight and call for very careful and detailed preparations. This is possible only if the procedures are based on good guidelines, taking into account as many foreseeable situations as possible, in order to avoid friction and loss of time during an OSI. Such methodical guidelines can only be developed in the unstressed atmosphere available in the discussions of WGB experts, but will not be possible during the execution of an OSI under the stress of an operation within a tight schedule.

The difficulties mentioned above are mostly concerned with the level of intrusiveness, the balance between the rights of the ISP and those of the IT, and the level of detail of guidelines to be included in the OM. Some of the main issues are:

The definition of the IT mission. One approach would allow the IT to search throughout the inspection area for every possible violation of the Treaty regardless of the triggering event. Another approach wishes the IT to search for the event that triggered the concern of the requesting state party as reflected in the OSI request. This main element cuts through the implementation of most OSI techniques and is reflected in many parts of the OSI OM. Types of data that the IT should be collecting. The Treaty refers to the collection of "relevant" data; however, this idea is not fully agreed. The balance of the Treaty provisions between the inspection's needs on one hand and the ISP rights to protect information not related to the purpose of the inspection is another issue not fully agreed. This mainly relates to issues not fully covered by the Treaty, such as the general information (e.g. maps) about the inspection area, and information that is not specific to the event that triggered the OSI request. To what extent the OSI procedures have to take into consideration the possibility that the right to request OSI was abused. One approach wishes to keep this issue in the hands of the EC; another approach wishes the IT to consider this possibility throughout the inspection. A definition of a cautious confidentiality policy for handling ISP sensitive information by the IT.

Putting all these disputes aside, the major challenge is to develop an OpMan that will justify the status of OSI in the CTBT verification regime. To fulfill this it has to be guaranteed that the OSI process will provide at its end a better knowledge about the concern reflected in the OSI request than was available prior to its launch. It has also to be guaranteed that it will act as a deterrent and not become an incentive for abusive requests.

The solutions will be in any case based on political compromise between the States involved. The deliberations underway in WGB in Vienna, which, assuming that they will proceed with determination and patience while emphasizing the substance over any other issue, are anticipated to lead eventually to consensus which will provide for effective guidelines, well-trained team members, appropriate equipment and proper administrative provisions.

IV. Capabilities and limits of the OSI regime after EIF

A. Focusing the mission

When deployed, the OSI team will have to come up with concrete technical findings demonstrating one of the following about the event that caused the concern of non-compliance: that it was a nuclear explosion, that it was a natural event or a non-nuclear man-made event, or that there is no way to prove either one of the two. Focusing the scope of the mission to the necessary purpose, and including well defined guidelines, will help the IT to progress with the mission, and in the same time to avoid getting side-tracked or stuck in a situation that can be foreseen and avoided. Despite the inherent constraints on the IT mission, it will have high prospect of success if it will be defined as clarifying the concern that was raised in the request (i.e. the event that triggered the request), and tailored to activities relevant to this purpose. Such focusing of the mission, except for being incorporated into the OpMan, will depend on the guidelines in the mandate issued by the DG, and on its successful execution by the IT leader.

B. Intrusiveness revisited

Limiting intrusiveness is a significant issue stressed in the Treaty more than once. Intrusiveness can be caused by "aggressive" inspectors, who are officially present only to monitor and observe defined types of information and phenomena, but are actually able to take in a lot of other information, inadvertently or otherwise, that may include sensitive data. The Treaty therefore reiterates the obligation of the IT to gather only relevant data (e.g., when discussing gamma radiation measurements.) 6

Intrusiveness may also be a result of the application of certain technologies, meant to search for nuclear explosion-related anomalies, whose use may expose sensitive and non-relevant information as a result of intrinsic similarity of some man-made phenomena to nuclear explosion phenomena (e.g., cavities vs. underground bunkers). This issue suggests that when technological options are being considered in monitoring and verification there is a need to have some provisions to demonstrate to those being monitored that the technologies being used are only being used for the purposes specified.1 The installation of "information barriers" for relevant technologies and equipment to be used in OSI is one way of taking care of such intrusiveness in advance (e.g. the "blinding" of gamma radiation measurements equipment.)

C. Deterrence revisited

It is true that OSIs are envisioned to be rarely used, but in order to be of any value as a deterrent against violations of the Treaty, the state parties (and the policy makers) should be convinced of its effectiveness. This can happen only if all those involved are confident that the OSI regime is correctly developed.

Except for routine monitoring using the IMS and analysis by the IDC, the technical secretariat (after entry into force) will be conducting OSI training and exercises. These activities have two reasons: one is to keep the inspectors up-to-date and to gain experience in OSI; the other is to demonstrate that the OSI regime is functioning and effective. An unsuccessful and inconclusive OSI, especially the first one, will have a detrimental effect on the credence of OSI and on the verification regime as a whole.

D. Technical problems

As already mentioned above, the geophysical techniques to be used in the later periods of OSI as they currently exist are not tailored to OSI needs, and have some inherent shortcomings when applied to the search for nuclear explosion signatures. The main problem is the lack of resolution, if a cavity of a nuclear explosion is being looked for in non-homogeneous geophysical environments. This problem may be solved in the future through R&D, but until then the IT will have to do with the existing resolution. The problem may be partially overcome by the utilization of synergy between the different available technologies.

Baseline information is another important factor for the effective performance of the verification regime. In the seismological IMS monitoring network this means the geophysical databases of travel times of seismological waves that enable best calculations of location. This can be improved by voluntary regional calibration and CBM.

In the OSI this concept relates to the geophysical techniques whose accuracy or threshold, that determine the detection possibility of anomalies related to nuclear explosions, are strongly dependent on baseline information, which in general is lacking. This is a difficult problem because of the local (small scale) nature of such information that is needed for the application of techniques such as gravitational field mapping and the different active seismology methods. In view of the unpredictable location of an OSI, the lack of applicable databases in this case may be intrinsic, because of the impossibility to cover the globe in advance with a dense set of measurements.

Because OSIs are ad hoc operations and start from scratch each time, information bases must be established anew each time an OSI begins, without the benefit of information collection in advance. The efficiency of these operations could be improved if the CTBTO was able to collect and analyze information about potential mission locations on an ongoing basis. This is an unlikely development, however, as member states (to any treaty) have an inherent resistance to allowing an international organization to undertake anything that might be even remotely considered to be independent intelligence gathering.1 Nonetheless, once the OSI is approved and is up and running the IT will establish, out of necessity, its own information gathering functions.

This can be partially amended by States Parties volunteering databases about regions they envision of having high probability as being challenged. A voluntary database may be established where States Parties interested in enhancing the verification regime will deposit data and information about their territory. This will be compounded with the information the TS has, such as standing arrangements with each SP, list of inspectors verified by this SP etc., to be used by the IT when needed.

E. The (non existing) inspectorate

The CTBTO will not have a standing OSI inspectorate, unlike other verification regimes. For each OSI, depending on the parameters known at the moment a request is filed for OSI, inspectors will be chosen from a pool of trained inspectors nominated by member states and the TS. This pool needs to be large enough (and geographically dispersed) to supply a team of up to 40 inspectors and inspection assistants having the required expertise for the specific OSI. This process of choosing the inspectors and assembling them has to be achieved within six days. Inspectors will require a diverse range of skills and the ability to work in harsh climates or terrain. Almost 150 potential candidates from 39 signatory states have participated in introductory courses conducted by the PTS until today, and this is still a meager start. The potential inspectors and inspection assistants will have to go through advanced courses and cross training in order to make them familiar with the other expertise in the team.

The coordination of the inspectors and inspection assistants base is definitely one of the major problems the CTBTO will face in coming years. An intensive program will have to be installed to track the training and availability of inspectors.

F. The timeline problem

Once a request for OSI is filed by a state party, the OSI clock starts to tick. The Operating Support Center, which is planned to be the administrative and logistical center of the operation, has to help the DG and the newly appointed Inspection Team Leader (ITL) to bring together the equipment and IT members to the point of entry in the inspected state within 6 days. During the first 4 days, until a decision is taken by the EC, the DG has to seek clarifications about the event that triggered the request from the state sought to be inspected in order to clarify and resolve the concern raised in the request. This is particularly important if a C&C (voluntary though recommended) has not been carried out.

Once the decision has been made by the EC to carry out the OSI following the request, the IT has up to 25 days for the first phase. At the end of this time (or earlier) a recommendation has to be formulated by the ITL whether to continue the OSI or stop it for either strong evidence on the one hand or no evidence on the other hand, and the IT findings up to that time have to be presented. This is a short time, taking into account the organization of the base of operation and planning of activities to be done, and the size of the area (up to 1000 sq km) to be covered. If the decision was made to continue the inspection beyond the initial 25 days, the IT may deploy the continuation period geophysical techniques that are time consuming and demanding and may slow down the process.

Starting at the point of entry, the ITL will have to be careful to avoid stalled situations when agreement is needed with the inspected state. Such situations may expend time that cannot be gained back because of the deadlines set by the Treaty on different stages.

G. ITL qualities and status

Because of the tight timelines adopted by the Treaty, an efficient and successful OSI will depend, among other things, on the personality and qualifications of the team leader, and on the guidelines and arrangements with which he will be equipped. There is no question that the result of an OSI depends heavily on the resourcefulness and leadership of the team leader. His ability and authority to make and apply decision at turning points of the inspection is of utmost importance. His diplomatic skills will have an important effect on the conduct of the OSI by avoiding unnecessary conflicts with the ISP, which may lead to inefficient use of the allotted time. The task of the ITL will be more controllable if he or she will be equipped with the best tools and guidelines possible.

In order to achieve optimal results from an OSI, the team leader will need experienced experts equipped with the right equipment and a good basis for planning the specific OSI including guidelines for different situations. This means a good and detailed Operations Manual, well-adjusted equipment, experienced and well-trained team members, and practical standing arrangements with the inspected state.

The unpredictable initiation of an OSI will create a situation which is unlikely to be covered by the regular financial regulation of the organisation, which have a system of controls that make it slow-reacting compared to the fast pace of the OSI. Special funding and expenditure regulations will have to be devised for this situation. These regulations will have to depend heavily on the authority of the team leader. Being directly under the DG, the team leader for all purposes should be given the appropriate status, e.g. a deputy DG, as he/she will need the authority and means to use funds with minimum bureaucratic delays.

One of the most difficult situations that a team leader may face is that in which there is no conclusive information found during the initial period or the continuation period that would point to a possible site related to the event that triggered the request. Based on his/her and the team's best expert judgment he/she may conclude that termination of the inspection is justified. This will pose a dilemma: political pressure may push for continuing the inspection throughout the 130 allowed days, while, according to his/her judgment, there is a high chance of obtaining only inconclusive findings. The latter may be regarded as his/her fault and incompatibility.

H. Environment - ISP and climate

Any OSI mission will be confronted by unforeseen limitations originating from two sources: The inspected state party and the environment.

The inspected state party, unidentified until a few days before the inspection, may pose an unpredictable level of cooperation. For its own national reasons or because of intrinsic inability, the inspected state may be uncooperative, and possibly even opposed to the OSI to the point of being disruptive. Whilst in the focus of an international crisis, the IT has to accomplish its mission with the least friction with the inspected state; at the same time the IT is dependent upon that state which is suspected of non-compliance and which may present restrictions and prohibitions.

The other factor to be revealed only after the request has been filed is the type of environment in which the requested inspection area resides. Diverse possible environments have to be accounted for in the preparations for OSI, taking into account almost any possible climate on the globe. This means that arrangements have to be made for availability of equipment and clothing for any such climate on a short notice, and the proper training and guidelines should be implemented in advance.

These unknown circumstances may hamper the conduct of the IT mission and cause, in extreme cases, partial fulfillment or failure of the mission. Thoughtful and flexible planning in the design of OSI infrastructure and guidelines are necessary to minimize such disruption of the mission.

V. Conclusion

What can an OSI be expected to achieve? The answer to this question depends heavily on the outcome of the preparations for the OSI regime that are in progress in Vienna. The OpMan development is the main issue in this process, and will have the strongest effect on the future OSI regime. The working assumption can be that an OpMan may be agreed sooner or later, or prepared somehow, but it cannot be presupposed what its content will be. It will have to be judged at the end of the process. Until then we can only work towards the most appropriate OpMan to be developed. "Appropriate" here means one that will best contribute to the CTBT verification regime while preserving the internal Treaty balances. We cannot assume, however, that the OpMan will eventually cover every possibility of the OSI regime. But, it is clear that an inadequate OSI manual will undermine the deterrence value of the verification regime.

A successful OSI is expected to provide significantly better knowledge than was known prior to the OSI about the event that triggered the OSI request. Assuming that the OSI regime is well prepared, this is a plausible, although difficult mission, considering the intrinsic problems and difficulties facing the IT as described above. These intrinsic problems cannot be solved by an OpMan, but the inclusion of good guidelines and the right arrangements may lessen their effect on the outcome of an OSI. Such arrangements will also strengthen the significance of the OSI in the Treaty verification regime.

Being a rare event, the TS may find it difficult to maintain tension and to avoid slipping into relaxed behavior. Another impairing factor will be the diminishing expertise in nuclear explosion phenomena as a result of the cessation of nuclear testing. Combined, these two processes may bring about a significant decrease in the effectiveness and deterrence of the OSI regime. This may be one of the most difficult challenges of the technical secretariat in future years. To avoid such a possibility the TS will have to be vigilant, resourceful and diligent in keeping the training and exercise program active, in all its aspects, against all trends.

References and Notes

1 Jane Boulden, The Verification and Monitoring of Peace Accords, Wilton Park Conference on the Monitoring and Verification of Peace Agreements, 24 March 2000, Cosponsored by the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC).

2 Article IV, Paragraph 1 of the Treaty: "1. In order to verify compliance with this Treaty, a verification regime shall be established consisting of the following elements: (a) An International Monitoring System; (b) Consultation and clarification; (c) On-site inspections; and (d) Confidence-building measures. At entry into force of this Treaty, the verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of this Treaty."

3 Article IV, Paragraph 29 of the Treaty: "29. Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request an on-site inspection, States Parties should, whenever possible, first make every effort to clarify and resolve, among themselves or with or through the Organization, any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty."

4 In support of the calibration initiative, three controlled underwater chemical explosions, announced in advance to the international CTBT community, were detonated in the Dead Sea between November 8 to 11, 1999. The three explosions were detonated by the Geophysical Institute of Israel, contractor to the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, in cooperation with the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, the National Data Center of Israel. The explosions were carried out with the objective of calibrating seismic travel times across the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean region to improve location estimates by the IMS.

5 Article IV, Paragraph 35 of the Treaty: "35. The sole Purpose of an on-site inspection shall be to clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of Article I and, to the extent possible, to gather any fact which might assist in identifying any possible violator."

6 Part II, paragraph 89(b) of the Protocol: "89. …the inspected State Party shall have the right… inter alia..: (b) Restricting measurements of radionuclide activity and nuclear radiation to determining the presence or absence of those types and energies of radiation relevant to the purpose of the inspection;"

7 OSI techniques according to Part II, Paragraph 69 of the Protocol. Group 1: Position finding; Visual observation; Video and still photography; Multi-spectral imaging; Gamma radiation monitoring; Gamma energy resolution analysis; Environmental sampling; Passive seismological monitoring; Group 2: Resonance seismometry; Active seismic surveys; Magnetic field mapping; Gravitational field mapping; Ground penetrating radar; Electrical conductivity; Group 3: Drilling; The use of these is restricted for different periods of the OSI: Up to 25th day - group 1 techniques. From 26th to 60th days (continuation period) - groups 1 and 2 techniques. From 61st to 130th days (extension period) - groups 1 and 2 techniques, according to IT indication in the extension request. On special approval - group 3.