Speech by the Rt. Hon. Peter Hain, MP, opening the Meeting of the Independent Commission on the Verifiability of the CTBT

Speech Opening the Meeting of the Independent Commission on the Verifiability of the CTBT*

The Rt. Hon. Peter Hain, MP, Minister for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, UK

Let me start by paying tribute to VERTIC's initiative in organising this Commission, in particular the Chairman, Trevor Findlay.

I should also like to thank the Executive Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat, Mr Hoffman for his co-operation and for allowing his officials to take part today and to the Commissioners who have agreed to provide their time and experience for this important work.

The fact that you are here in your individual capacities as independent experts is important in the light of the differing national views on the CTBT.

By banning all nuclear test explosions, the Treaty will constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. It will be a major step on the road towards ridding the world of the means to destroy itself.

The importance of this treaty and the desire of the International Community to see it enter into force has been underlined on numerous occasions this year such as the NPT Review Conference, the G8 Summit in Okinawa and the ongoing UNGA. There is widespread consensus that this treaty should and must enter into force as soon as possible.

Unfortunately, almost exactly four years after the Treaty was opened for signature, progress towards entry into force has been patchy. To date, only 30 out of the 44 States whose ratification is necessary for the Treaty to enter into force have deposited their Instruments of Ratification and three of those 44 States have yet to sign the Treaty. The UK is, of course, one of the 30 as are two other Nuclear Weapons States, France and Russia. We take every opportunity to encourage others to join us and I would again today urge all States to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible.

India and Pakistan have announced unilateral moratoria on further nuclear explosions. I welcome these announcements. But, they cannot be a substitute for signature and ratification of the CTBT. I hope that efforts in both countries to build consensus in favour of signature will soon result in a positive outcome.

We attach great importance to the push towards entry into force, the so-called Article XIV process, currently being ably guided by our Japanese colleagues. Last year's conference in Vienna, which I attended, was designed specifically to encourage further Treaty signatures and ratification, did just that. We are keen to see another Article XIV conference next year and encourage Ambassador Abe [who is with us today] in his efforts to take forward arrangements. We must use this Conference to maintain the political momentum in support of the Treaty.

Clearly, a major obstacle in persuading others to sign was the vote in October last year by the US Senate not to ratify the Treaty. That was a matter of deep regret to us and an obvious set back to the Treaty. But it is important that it should be seen as no more than that: a set back. We must not let the Senate's decision be an excuse for others to delay their own signature and ratification of the Treaty.

Equally importantly, we must we not let the Senate's vote be an excuse to delay the work necessary to prepare for the Treaty's entry into force. We welcome and support the efforts being made by the US Administration to take forward the debate in their country, particularly the appointment of General Shalikashvili [General Shali] to head the Task Force. I hope that these efforts, together with the work of this Commission will clarify issues raised during the US' consideration of the Treaty. I further hope that the incoming Administration will continue these policies and make the ratification of the CTBT a priority.

The basis for the verification system is, as you well know, set out in the treaty itself

"In order to verify compliance with this Treaty, a verification regime shall be established consisting of the following elements:
(a) An International Monitoring System;
(b) Consultation and clarification;
(c) On-site inspections; and
(d) Confidence-building measures."

Britain is confident that the verification regime described in the Treaty will provide a credible, effective and cost effective way to monitor compliance with the Treaty. But, we acknowledge that others may not share that view. We also acknowledge that technology has changed, even in the short time since the CTBT was negotiated. We believe that it is right therefore for independent experts such as yourselves to take a fresh look at the verifiability of the Treaty and to give us the benefit of your expertise.

The CTBT exists because of the political will of the negotiating States to negotiate the treaty. But the work, the desire to see a functioning Treaty did not end with the conclusion of the negotiations. It only began. We must now address issues such as providing the Provisional Technical Secretariat with adequate resources to enable it to fulfil the requirement of the Treaty. The Provisional Technical Secretariat must be given the means to have a verification regime in place at entry into force capable of meeting the verification requirements of this treaty.

I know that the amount of financial resources that the Provisional Technical Secretariat needs to carry out its functions has been a subject of some debate in the course of the year and indeed in previous years. Britain has already made clear our belief that the level of budget and programme for 2001 as now proposed by the Provisional Technical Secretariat is reasonable. We will support this budget when it comes up for discussion at the Preparatory Commission in November. We hope that others, particularly those who are the leading proponents of nuclear disarmament will do likewise.

The work of establishing the verification system also means dealing with other issues such as how the key work of putting together the On Site Inspection Manual can gain badly needed momentum. I understand that there has been recent progress during discussions in Vienna in at least agreeing the process by which we can do this. Next year, it will be vital to tackle the substance.

Your work will by definition concentrate on technical aspects of CTBT verification. But Governments must maintain the political momentum which brought the CTBT into being. We must make sure that the technical discussions in Vienna do not become bogged down or delayed. Beyond that, we have a wider duty to create the conditions which remove the need to develop nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We must build on the results achieved at the NPT Review Conference earlier this year to advance towards our common goal: the global elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We must consolidate progress made towards eliminating chemical warfare - 136 countries are now participating in the OPCW. We have a Verification Protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention that is within our grasp. We must ensure that humankind is denied the tools to for selfdestruction. The British Government is committed to playing an active and positive role in achieving these goals. We will continue to play this role to the full.

All the WMD instruments are underpinned by verification systems. Each has their critics. But, I leave you with one thought. Those who criticise the Treaty need to consider whether they prefer the alternative: the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I prefer that our discussion today should be about how best to verify a Treaty banning nuclear test explosions than about how best to monitor the explosions that the absence of the treaty would permit.

* ammended during delivery